The Palestinians have learned their lessons from the tunnel riots. In advance of the big confrontation, which will begin immediately after Arafat declares independence, they will prepare firing positions, anti-tank weapons, communication systems and an effective civil defense system. In Gaza and the West Bank, people understand that a mass civilian uprising -- which police forces will join only in the second stage -- is the most effective way of contending with the IDF's great clumsiness. And it also looks great on television screens abroad.
Seven months before May 1999, the target date set by Arafat for declaring the Palestinian state, both sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians, hope for the best, but are secretly and quickly planning and preparing for the worst.
The "best" refers to an ideal situation in which, through mutual agreement, the second and third redeployments are implemented, and a common formula for coexistence between the peoples is found, in the framework of the final status agreement.
The "worst" means the creation of a protracted freeze in negotiations, whether before or after the second redeployment, with both parties digging into their positions. In such an impasse, the danger of an outbreak of violence on the ground, according to intelligence assessments, is almost inevitable.
Until a short while ago, defense officials believed that, whatever happens, until May 1999 Arafat would bite his tongue and do everything possible to prevent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians, primarily so as not to lose American support.
Recently, however, this assessment was updated and, for the first time, a new working assumption was raised. Now, the possibility that Arafat, because of various constraints which will be detailed below, will declare a state even before next May is being taken into account, and this gives rise to the danger that the Palestinian street will also erupt even prior to this, not necessarily according to an initiative and order from above.
The reason, according to defense officials' feeling, is that under the surface in the West Bank and Gaza, the "ground is burning" and full of activity. It is not the merchants or simple citizens who are fanning the fire. The economic situation of these people has actually improved recently, as a result of the fact that the closure on the territories has become almost completely unraveled: for every 60,000 legal workers in Israel, there are currently about 60,000 more Palestinians who enter Israel each day without work permits.
Those who are turning up the temperature are actually the members of Fatah's "tenzim" (the organization), which operates in the territories and is under Arafat's control. This organization is operated by Fatah activists -- most of whom are graduates of Israeli prisons -- and numbers thousands of youths and students. Many of the members undergo training in employing "soft resistance" vis-a-vis Israel, from sticks and stones to tossing grenades.
In Israel, there has recently been a noticeable sharpening of statements and calls by "tenzim" activists, at demonstrations and other events, to escalate popular resistance actions if it becomes clear that Netanyahu is standing firm. At other Fatah gatherings, "tenzim" activists burn wooden models of settlements. "A pistol lying on the table in the fist act," says an Israeli defense official, quoting the well-known expression, "It is reasonable to assume that it will be employed in the third act, certainly before the end of the play."
For the Palestinians, and even more for the Israeli defense establishment, the tunnel events, which cost the IDF 15 dead and more than twice that number for the Palestinians, were a traumatic experience. Both sides set up special committees, which learned lessons and drew up contingency plans to contend with large-scale violent events in the territories. The IDF working plan received the nickname "Field of Thorns." For the Palestinians, code names are a marginal issue.
The main lesson of the September 1996 events for the IDF is that there is a need to increase the precision fire power for dealing with such situations. Over the past two years, the IDF has procured a very large quantity of telescopic sights and many soldiers have been sent to sniper courses. The doctrine of hitting the target, which was neglected since the incidents along the Suez Canal during the War of Attrition in the early '70s, has now received renewed momentum.
Other lessons that have been learned by the defense establishment: to increase protection on vehicles; to correctly exploit the landscape; to know where to position roadblocks in the event of a flare-up of rioting; and dozens of other recommendations that were sent for study to Central Command and Southern Command.
On the other side, as well, lessons were drawn and serious thought was done. The feeling among the Palestinians, despite the fact that they suffered more losses than the IDF in the tunnel incidents, is that the clash with the IDF in September 1996, at Joseph's Tomb and in other locations, was successful from their standpoint, and underscored the clear advantage of their mobility and ease of movement, opposite the clumsiness and heaviness of the Israeli war machine.
Beyond this, the tunnel incidents highlighted, several times over, a fact that was well-known to the Palestinians even before the Intifada: Images of armed soldiers firing at "defenseless civilians" photograph better in the world media and give immediate points to the weak side, even in the midst of a battle that has not yet ended. Ambulances with sirens wailing rushing the injured to the hospital are a photographic reminder of a people's struggle for political independence.
In this spirit, the Palestinian scenario for a future confrontation with the IDF in the territories was also formed. The Palestinian answer to Field of Thorns will be, apparently, an "improved model of the 1996 events." The number one point in this scenario: It will not be armed Palestinian police in uniform who will be on the front line with IDF soldiers, but civilians -- youths, students, members of the "tenzim" -- who will be the ones throwing stones, taunting soldiers and trying to drag them into escalating the confrontation. Palestinian policemen, who will take off their uniforms, will stand in the rear line; some of them, it should be assumed, behind the telescopic sights of sniper rifles.
Point #2: Only at a stage when the friction flares will uniformed Palestinian police and security personnel go into action; apparently to separate the sides, but actually without trying too hard.
Point #3: Sending out the Red Crescent Society ambulances, some to evacuate the injured and killed, some in order to transfer reinforcements from place to place and to whisk fugitives away. According to Israeli assessments, there are more ambulances in the West Bank and Gaza than in all of Israel, though not necessarily with the level of equipment that is found in Israel. Most of them were donated to the PA by foreign countries and organizations. The ambulances, too, go over well on TV screens.
Another pretext for early flare-ups could be a Palestinian reaction over an Israel provocation by radical elements among the settlers, like that of Baruch Goldstein, or as a result of an indiscriminate shooting by IDF forces at Palestinians next to a roadblock or in some incident. An incident such as the one involving the convoy of Abu Ali Shahin, the Palestinian Minister of Supply, which was blocked in Gush Katif in early July, could provide a pretext for a serious conflagration.
There are several possible focal points at which a flare-up could occur:
In dry-run exercises, the IDF reached the conclusion that entering the smallest city under the control of the Palestinian Authority would cost hundreds of dead. The Palestinians know this and according to their own scenarios, in the event of a general conflagration, efforts must be made to drag the IDF into the cities. The intention is, of course, to turn this entrance in to a death trap from which there is no escape, and all necessary preparations have been made for this:
The Palestinians' working assumption is that in the event of a stalemate in the political process and Israel digging in its heels, only a combination of a popular uprising of helpless civilians and international public opinion will convince Israel to reach an agreed-upon solution. The declaration of an independent Palestinian state in May 1999, or possibly even earlier, is intended to increase the pressure.
The evaluation in Israel is that Arafat will declare the establishment if a Palestinian state on all the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which will of course be an incentive to those groups in the Palestinian camp who want to attack the settlements. At this stage, there is almost no doubt that the Arab world, European states and the Third World would publicly support and recognize the new state. The French, for example, have already announced their guaranteed recognition. All the PLO's missions throughout the world operate nearly 24 hours a day to win maximum support for this endeavor of declaring a state and uprooting the settlements from the territories.
It is not clear to the Palestinians what the Americans would do. From Arafat's perspective, it is enough for them not to express opposition to the declaration, as a function of their apparent willingness to place most of blame for the freezing of the peace process on Netanyahu. In this connection, only one thing bothers Arafat: Will the Americans also support a declaration naming eastern Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state? He is concerned that Washington will oppose such a step, due to its position that there must be a negotiated solution to the question of Jerusalem.
The Palestinian War of Independence could begin in another seven months, possibly earlier, unless something unexpected occurs in the meantime that will stop the deterioration. The feeling is that the moment that Yasser Arafat announces that May 1999 is the target date for the declaration of a Palestinian state, the genie will be let out of the bottle, and it is possible that not he will be able to put it back. Every day that passes without a breakthrough in the peace process only increases expectations in the territories towards the historic declaration.
At the moment, the impression is that only implementing the second redeployment and a serious intention by Jerusalem to enter intensive negotiations on the permanent settlement can postpone the date. Maybe guarantees by the United States to act to change the PLO's status at the UN and raise extensive financial support for the organization.
But this would only be a postponement. The Palestinian train has long since left the station and Israel's only chance is, apparently, between a Palestinian state established within an agreement and a state that will be founded amidst the storm of a violent uprising.